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REEXAMINING THE SPECIAL EXCEPTION
by
Sidney A. Fizwaler*
WO lawyers appeared in court to argue special exceptions.'
Notwithstanding that the parties had already undertaken extensive
discovery, including scores of interrogatories and requests for ad-
missions, numerous depositions, and several document production re-
quests, each attorney complained vigorously that he knew little about the
other side's case because his opponent's pleadings were vague, duplicative,
and failed to give fair notice of his claim or defense. Some of the excep-
tions, in fact, were leveled at amended pleadings that had been filed as a
result of special exceptions previously sustained. The hearing consumed
almost one hour of court time. 2
Texas trial courts are overcrowded;3 the judges who preside in them are
hard-pressed to dispose of numerous cases on file.4 Generally trial judges
cannot afford to devote substantive attention to preliminary matters that
do not dispose of a lawsuit or substantially promote the final, just adjudi-
cation of a case. Court appearances for preliminary matters likewise bur-
den busy trial practitioners and generate additional legal costs for litigants.
The special exception is a procedural device that can consume substantial
* B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Judge, 298th Judicial District of Texas.
I. The special exception is a procedural device by which a party can question the
sufficiency in law of his opponent's claim, raise dilatory matters shown on the face of the
pleadings, and point out formal defects in particular allegations. The mechanics of the spe-
cial exception are set forth in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 90 and 91. For the text of
these rules, see infra note 10.
2. This story is in part apocryphal, but the scenario is often replayed, to greater or
lesser degrees, in Texas trial courts.
3. Docket Backlog Threatens Judicial System. Texas Chief Justice Recommends Legis-
lation to Speed Up Court Proceedings, Houston Chron., Jan. 18, 1983, § I, at 7. col. 1; see
also Bottinelli v. Robinson, 594 S.W.2d 112, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979,
no writ) ("this [is an] era of crowded dockets").
4. See TEXAS OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM ANNUAL
REPORT OF STATISTICAL AND OTHER DATA FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1982, at 154 (1983). That
report noted:
Another way to view the volume of cases pending [in Texas district courts] on
December 31, 1982, is to assume that no new cases are filed in 1983 and that
all the present district judges dispose of cases at the same rate as during 1982.
At that rate, it would take an average of 485.6 days per court to dispose of the
cases pending at the end of 1982.
Id.
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court and attorney time5 while infrequently playing a major role in a law-
suit's resolution.6 Existing procedural devices can not only perform func-
tions equivalent to the special exception but can also promote just and
expeditious adjudication of a controversy without imposing undue cost
and time burdens upon the bench and bar.
As a matter of policy, moreover, one may question whether Texas trial
courts should continue to referee the adequacy of the form of pleadings in
light of the liberalized pleading standards set forth in the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. Special exceptions are utilized most frequently to identify
defects and force clarification and specification in pleadings. 7 The Texas
rules, however, are essentially antithetical to this function because they re-
quire only a plain and concise statement sufficient to give fair notice of a
plaintiff's cause of action and of what he relies upon as a ground for
recovery.8
This Article examines the foregoing utilitarian and policy arguments for
abrogating use of the special exception and considers whether the special
exception practice is sufficiently flawed to warrant reexamination by the
Subcommittee on Rules and Statutes of the State Bar Committee on Ad-
ministration of Justice and the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 The Article then proposes alternate procedural
measures for study and debate by these two distinguished committees.
I. ORIGIN AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIAL EXCEPTION
The Texas Supreme Court promulgated the special exception '0 in 1940''
5. Special exceptions must be brought to the attention of the trial court so that they
may be heard and ruled upon. Castilleja v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1966), afdon other grounds, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
6. The special exception would play a major role in the resolution of a lawsuit in thelimited instance where a plaintiff "pleads himself out of court"; that is, he pleads facts that
affirmatively negate his cause of action. See, e.g., Morris v. Hargrove, 351 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Salcedo v. Diaz, 647 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex.
App.-El Paso), writ refd n.r.e as to Diaz and writ granted as to Salcedo per curiam sub nom.
Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 650 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1983), the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's sustaining a special exception and consequent dismissal of one party to a lawsuit
brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act where the pleadings affirmatively revealed that the
defendant had not undertaken an action that was exempt from the immunity established by
the Act.
7. 2 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS
§ 7.21 (rev. ed. 1982).
8. TEX. R. Civ. P. 45, 47; 2 R. MCDONALD, supra note 7, § 5.02.2. For the text of rules
45 and 47, see infra notes 61, 62.
9. These two bodies study, debate, draft, and recommend rule changes to the Supreme
Court of Texas. Their workings are discussed in detail in Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil
Procedure Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 17-20 (1978).
10. The mechanics of the special exception are outlined in Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 90 and 91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 90 provides:
General demurrers shall not be used. Every defect, omission or fault in a
pleading either of form or of substance, which is not specifically pointed out
by exception in writing and brought to the attention of the judge in the trial
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as a salutary replacement for the general demurrer, a boilerplate assertion
addressed to the plaintiffs pleadings as a whole that contended "the plain-
tiffs petition is wholly insufficient in law to state any cause of action
against the defendant."' 2 The general demurrer called into question the
legal sufficiency of the facts alleged with respect to either the entire plead-
ing or one of several causes of action.' 3 By using this "venerable
weapon" 14 the defendant triggered a search of all plaintiffs prior pleadings
to locate the first fundamental error contained therein.' 5 This outmoded
practice was a vestige of old common law ideas according to which sub-
stance often yielded to form; it required the trial court, frequently without
any explication more specific than the standard language of the demurrer,
to determine whether a petition was in some manner legally insufficient.' 6
The function of the special exception, on the other hand, is to furnish
parties with a medium by which to force clarification of and specification
in their opponents' pleadings.' 7 In contrast to the demurrer, the special
exception must be framed as a particularized, intelligible attack on the suf-
ficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings.' 8 Accordingly, every defect, omission, or
fault of either form or substance not brought to the attention of the trial
court specifically and in writing before the instruction or charge to the
jury, or in a nonjury case before the judgment is signed, is deemed
waived. '9 The drafters designed the rule to simplify trial procedures by
requiring that one who complains of a defect in the other party's allega-
court before the instruction or charge to the jury or, in a non-jury case, before
the judgment is signed, shall be deemed to have been waived by the party
seeking reversal on such account; provided that this rule shall not apply as to
any party against whom default judgment is rendered.
ld, 91 provides:
A special exception shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted
to, but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect,
omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allega-
tions in the pleading excepted to.
11. See generally McDonald, The Background of the Texas Procedural Rules, 19 TEX. L.
REV. 229 (1941) (discussion of origin and background of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure at
time of their promulgation).
12. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.17.
13. 45 TEX. JUR. 2DPleading § 113 (1963).
14. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.17.
15. State v. Williams, 8 Tex. 128, 133 (1852).
16. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.17.
17. Yeager Elec. & Plumbing Co. v. Ingleside Cove Lumber & Builders, Inc., 526
S.W.2d 738, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ); McFarland v. Reynolds,
513 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
18. Throughout this Article special exceptions are treated as if addressed by a defend-
ant to plaintiff's pleadings. Such exceptions, of course, may be lodged by a plaintiff in his
supplemental petition to a pleading of defendant, TEX. R. Civ. P. 80, and by a counter-
defendant to the counterclaim of a counter-plaintiff, id. 81. Likewise, the special exception
is the proper device to be used by a plaintiff to test the sufficiency of an answer. Terehkov v.
Cruz, 648 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
19. TEX. R. Civ. P. 90; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex.
1978); Rose v. Burton, 614 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ refd
n.r.e.).
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SOUTHWESTERN LA W JOURNAL
tions point out the defect in writing.20 A defendant cannot "lie behind the
log" as with a general demurrer and then, if he suffers an adverse result,
urge reversal on a ground not specifically presented to the trial court. 2 1
The special exception is currently used to perform three particular func-
tions:22 (1) to question the sufficiency in law of a plaintiffs alleged
claim;23 (2) to raise dilatory matters shown on the face of the pleadings;2 4
and (3) to point out formal defects in particular allegations, that is, to sup-
ply omissions, 25 to force clarification of unclear or unspecific pleadings, 26
or to strike improper allegations. 27
While the special exception indisputably improved upon the general de-
murrer as a device for testing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings and
evidenced considerable foresight when promulgated as one of the new
Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas courts and litigants should use procedures
that, unlike the special exception, are designed to promote the resolution
of causes rather than to engender additional waves of pleadings that must
be drafted by attorneys, funded by litigants, and ruled upon by judges.
Further, in light of liberalized Texas notice pleading standards, it is debat-
able whether, as a matter of policy, pleadings should be subject to chal-
lenge on the basis of form.
II. THE SPECIAL EXCEPTION AND AVAILABLE
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS
A. To Question the Sufficiency in Law of Plaintifs Claim
A party may lodge a special exception to question the sufficiency in law
of a plaintiffs claim; that is, a special exception may be used to allege that
20. Employers Casualty Co. v. Wilson, 495 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1973, no writ).
21. Insufficiency of pleading cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Lowther v.
Lowther, 578 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.): Tolson v.
Carroll, 313 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no writ).
22. In addition to the functions discussed, which are direct in nature, the special excep-
tion indirectly affects the admissibility of evidence and the submission of special issues to the
jury because it can shape the contents of the pleadings. Trial courts, of course, are to deter-
mine admissibility of evidence and entitlement to submission of special issues, in part, by
referring to the pleadings. See, e.g., Kissman v. Bendix Home Syss., 587 S.W.2d 675, 677
(Tex. 1979); Kainer v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. 1964); Gonzales v. Orsak, 205
S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1947, no writ). Thus, to the extent a special
exception brings about additions to or deletions from the pleadings it affects the evidence
and the charge. For a brief discussion of available functional equivalents for these uses of
the special exception, see infra note 57.
23. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.19.
24. Id. § 7.20.
25. Id. § 7.21.
26. Anderson Dev. Corp. v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co.. 543 S.W.2d 402, 405
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.21.
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no legal rule justifies a recovery on a claim of the type presented, 28 or to
allege that, although there is a legal rule that may be applicable, the peti-
tion omits one or more allegations essential to bring plaintiffs claim within
its scope,29 or to allege that there is a legal rule that may be applicable but
the petition on its face shows facts that negate its application. 30 Rarely,
however, does such an exception dispose of a lawsuit, 3I and it never does
so unless the trial court first gives the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the
defect.32 A second round of pleading is thus built into the practice because
a party receives an opportunity to amend as a matter of right. An excep-
tion may preclude a claim only where the plaintiff fails to replead a cause
of action,33 which is an infrequent occurrence. 34 The reported cases, in
fact, appear limited to those in which a plaintiff has simply refused to re-
plead.35 Notwithstanding this important functional limitation, in Texas
practice a party usually raises by special exception the contention that the
plaintiff has failed to allege a cause of action.36
28. See, e.g., Ryan v. Holcombe, 170 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1943, no writ).
29. See, e.g., Covington v. Associated Employers Lloyds, 195 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ refd); Glazier v. Tilton, 81 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1934, writ dism'd) (special exception may be used for allegation that suit
was brought prematurely because essential element of cause of action had not yet occurred).
Overruling a special exception that points out the failure to allege essential elements of a
claim is error. Union Producing Co. v. Allen, 297 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1957, no writ).
30. See, e.g., Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564 S.W.2d 816, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (language of petition brought claim within two-year
statute of limitation, thus requiring dismissal); Williams v. Muse, 369 S.W.2d 467, 470-71
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ refd n.r.e.) (allegation in petition of oral contract
barred by statute of frauds).
31. See, e.g., Salcedo v. Diaz, 647 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-El Paso), writ refdn.r.e as to
Diaz and writ granted as to Salcedo per curiam sub nom. Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 650
S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1983).
32. Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974): Ainsworth v.
Homes of St. Mark, 530 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no
writ).
33. Powers v. Smith, 627 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.);
Atkinson v. Reid, 625 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
34. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.19.
35. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Yenawine, 556 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, no writ) (plaintiff may refuse to amend and test special exception on appeal); Town-
send v. Memorial Medical Center, 529 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court properly entered final order of dismissal after plaintiff's
refusal to amend pleadings); Farias v. Besteiro, 453 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (dismissal with prejudice is proper when special excep-
tions going to existence of cause of action are sustained and plaintiff refuses to amend):
Rutledge v. Valley Evening Monitor, 289 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1956, no writ) (court can properly dismiss when portion of petition remaining after special
exception has been sustained fails to state cause of action and plaintiff declines to amend).
36. Mac's Old Plantation Cracklings, Inc. v. Lucas, No. 05-82-00270-CV, slip op. at 2
(Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 1, 1983, no writ) (not yet reported); accord McFarland v. Reyn-
olds, 513 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ). The Texas
Supreme Court recently held that the special exception must be used to raise the issue of
failure to state a cause of action. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.
1983) (citing Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (1974)).
1983]
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The better practice, which could promote a just resolution of litigation
rather than merely precipitate successive waves of pleadings and the at-
tendant delay thereby engendered, 37 would replace the special exception
that contends plaintiffs petition is insufficient in law with a motion for
summary judgment predicated on such reasoning and filed after discov-
ery38 has been undertaken. 39 One may easily raise the contention that no
legal rule justifies recovery on a claim, as well as the argument that the
petition reveals facts that defeat a right of recovery, by means of a sum-
mary judgment motion. A contention that the allegations omit essential
elements is better resolved after discovery on the ground that there is no
evidence to support the omitted components than before discovery on the
ground that the plaintiff has simply failed to plead those elements. A
claim that is so unmeritorious that it would fail when tested by special
exception a fortiori should be capable of disposition by motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Replacement of the special exception with the motion for summary
judgment, moreover, would promote use by the trial court and litigants of
a process specifically designed to determine whether or not a litigant has
stated a claim that warrants a trial. The summary judgment process con-
37. Elimination of delay is a compelling reason for dispensing with interim procedural
devices such as the special exception. The federal pleading rules, for example, are designed
to eliminate delay and reduce pleading requirements to a minimum. 2A J. MOORE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 8.02, at 8-20 (rev. ed. 1983).
38. Such discovery need not be extensive. In many cases it might consist merely of the
following interrogatory: "State all the facts upon which you rely in support of the allegation
in paragraph - of your petition that [here repeat allegation inquired about]."
39. Texas flatly rejects use of the summary judgment motion for this purpose. In Mas-
sey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983), the trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of
action. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, but the supreme court reversed, stating:
The court of appeals, however, erred in affirming the summary judgment of
the trial court. The issue whether the pleadings fail to state a cause of action
may not be resolved by summary judgment. In Texas Department of Correc-
tions v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974), we wrote:
[Oinly after a party has been given an opportunity to amend
after special exceptions have been sustained may the case be dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action. . . . This court
believes that the protective features of special exception proce-
dures should not be circumvented by a motion for summary
judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff's pleadings . . . fail
to state a cause of action.
Id. at 934. Rejecting use of the summary judgment motion to attack a plaintiff's failure to
allege a cause of action is unjustified. The rationale for Massey and Herring appears to be
that a plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend his pleadings before his case is
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The coordinate interests of using a superior
procedural device like the summary judgment motion and permitting a plaintiff reasonable
opportunity to amend, however, are easily accommodated by the trial court's granting plain-
tiff leave to amend his petition after a summary judgment motion is filed. If the plaintiff
successfully alleges a cause of action, the summary judgment motion is denied; if he cannot,
or if discovery reveals no factual support for the cause of action alleged, the motion is
granted. Indeed, one jurist has observed: "[Simplified notice pleading rules] fit in naturally
with and are supplemented by, rules for discovery, pre-trial, and summary judgment." C.
CLARK, SIMPLIFIED PLEADING (ABA Judicial Administration Monograph, Series A, No. 18)
(emphasis added), quoted in 6 FED. R. SERV. 819, 831 (1943).
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tains numerous procedural and substantive safeguards designed to ensure
that only patently unmeritorious lawsuits and those that may be resolved
on undisputed facts and as a matter of law are eliminated short of trialA°
By focusing the attention of the parties and the trial court upon summary
judgment issues rather than upon pleading issues, the judicial system could
more facilely advance the status of the litigation, eliminate potential time
and cost encumbrances upon the court, attorneys, and litigants in dealing
with intermediate pleading skirmishes, and use procedures intentionally
geared to test the sufficiency of claims.
B. To Raise Dilatory Matters
Litigants may also employ the special exception to contend that a peti-
tion on its face reveals grounds that compel suspension or abatement of the
lawsuit.4' The special exception urging abatement, however, is limited
solely to matters shown by the plaintiffs pleadings.42 If a defendant must
rely upon extrinsic facts, he may raise the issue by plea in abatement but
not by special exception. 43 Because the plea in abatement may be predi-
cated upon any matter shown to the trial court, whether or not revealed in
the pleadings," it is a more versatile device for raising dilatory matters
than is the special exception. Moreover, because a party may replead as a
matter of right to a special exception sustained by the trial court, the judge
would commit error if he abated an action in response to an exception
without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. 45 Inefficient, suc-
cessive rounds of repleading, rather than a definitive ruling on the issue of
abatement, are the likely result of this procedure. The better practice
would be to use the plea in abatement rather than the special exception to
raise dilatory matters.46
C To Point Out Defects in Particular Allegations
Special exceptions commonly allege formal defects in a plaintiffs allega-
tions.47 These exceptions can generally be classified in four categories,
40. Discussion in detail of the applicable Texas law of summary judgments is beyond
the scope of this Article. See generally TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A (procedural safeguards). For
applicable substantive standards, see City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979); Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1952).
41. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.20.
42. When the grounds for abatement are not reflected on the face of the pleadings, a
plea in abatement must be used. Jay-Lor Textiles, Inc. v. Pacific Compress Warehouse Co.,
547 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Salcedo v. Diaz, 647 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. App.-El Paso), writ rejdn.r.e. as to Diaz
and writ granted as to Salcedo per curiam sub nom. Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 650
S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1983).
44. Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 520 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ).
45. Cozad v. Roman, 570 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ).
46. 2 R. MCDONALD, supra note 7, § 7.20. "To avoid question, Townes recommended
a plea in abatement even when the nonjoinder or misjoinder was evident on the face of the
pleadings." Id. § 7.20 n.I.
47. Id. § 7.21.
1983]
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which contend that the pleadings: (1) contain omissions;48 (2) contain ob-
scurities;49 (3) fail to give fair notice of the claim; 50 or (4) contain improper
allegations, surplusage, and matters that are evidentiary, argumentative,
impertinent, scandalous, inflammatory, irrelevant, immaterial, frivolous,
or are improperly framed so as to prejudice the defendant before the
jury.5' The third category contains the most frequently alleged defects,
such as where the excepting party contends he has not been provided with
sufficient, particular details of his opponent's claim to conduct a defense.
5 2
Exceptions from the first and second categories, alleging that the pleadings
omit essential allegations or are obscure, are used to a lesser extent. Elimi-
nation of the practice of reading the pleadings to the jury has minimized
use of the last category of exception.5 3
This discussion focuses upon the most frequent special exception, which
alleges that the petition fails to set out sufficient details of the plaintiffs
claim. As with the other special exception functions previously analyzed,
there is a more effective procedural option than the special exception for
the purpose of gaining fair notice of the opponent's claim. Parties may use
discovery in the form of depositions, interrogatories, requests for admis-
sions, and requests for production of documents to accomplish this func-
tion of the special exception. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
Conley v. Gibson 5 "simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures estab-
lished by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues." 55
The framers of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure envisioned reliance
on discovery as part of an integrated procedure intended to determine
before trial the issues genuinely in dispute.5 6 Discovery is designed, by
carefully crafted rules of procedure, to enable a party to ferret out the un-
derlying basis for another party's claims and defenses. The Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure define the scope of discovery, set out the duty to supple-
ment, prescribe sanctions for failure to make discovery, and detail the pro-
cedures for conducting discovery. Oftentimes, discovery is already under
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.). "The special exception is properly used to demand particularity in pleadings if
pleadings do not properly apprise a party of his opponent's contentions." Id.
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 70.1 10[l][b], at 70-31 (rev. ed. 1983).
53. TEX. R. Cv. P. 265(a) was amended effective Jan. 1, 1978, to eliminate the option of
reading the pleadings to the jury in opening statement. Rule 265(a) now provides:
The party upon whom rests the burden of proof on the whole case shall state
to the jury briefly the nature of his claim or defense and what said party ex-
pects to prove and the relief sought. Immediately thereafter, the adverse party
may make a similar statement, and intervenors and other parties will be ac-
corded similar rights in the order determined by the court.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 265(a).
54. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
55. Id. at 47-48.
56. 2 R. MCDONALD, supra note 7, § 5.02.2.
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way when a defendant makes an exception claiming that he cannot ascer-
tain from the pleadings the true nature of the plaintiff's claims. This dis-
covery may already have supplied, or likely will supply, a factual basis for
clarification of omitted, obscure, or conclusory allegations, thus obviating
the need for more specific pleadings.
The better practice would be to require litigants to rely upon discovery
to provide the details of a claim and abrogate use of the special exception
for this purpose. 57 In McCamey v. Kinnear58 the Beaumont court of civil
appeals articulated the reasoning that underlies this proposal:
The object and purpose of pleading is to give fair and adequate
notice to a party being sued of the nature of the cause of action as-
serted against him so that he may adequately prepare his defense
thereto. . . . The plaintiff was not required to plead his evidence in
detail and tf the defendant desired more factual detail as to the basis of
the claim, he had but to invoke the discovery process authorized by the
rules 59
As a matter of judicial economy, courts and attorneys could better
devote their time to examining the evidentiary foundation for a claim
rather than resolving the phrasing of each allegation. For example, a
pleading that contends the defendant is "indebted" to the plaintiff or that
the defendant has been "negligent" is presently subject to special exception
because, standing alone, it does not give fair notice or furnish adequate
information so as to permit the court to determine the necessity and range
of trial on the merits.60 The parties should subject such allegations to
trenchant discovery calculated to disclose the underlying factual predicate
for the claims rather than make them the basis of a pleading squabble.
Even if a party files a special exception and the trial court requires the
plaintiff to replead, in all likelihood the defendant will thereafter direct the
same or similar discovery inquiries to any such amended pleading and
procure from such discovery the information he would have received by
proceeding to discovery without urging the special exception. Pragmati-
cally, such intermediate pleading steps should be omitted altogether.
If an instance should arise, however, where the petition is intrinsically
inadequate and varies so far from the standards for proper pleading pre-
57. The special exception is also a device that can shape the admission of evidence and
the submission of special issues. See supra note 22. The function of regulating admissibility
of evidence can likewise be fulfilled by the trial court's examination of each party's discov-
ery responses as well as its pleadings to determine whether they disclose the matters about
wfiich evidence is offered. The function of shaping special issues can be accomplished by
the trial court's examination of discovery responses, pleadings, and evidence to determine if
an issue has been raised or tried by consent such that a special issue may be submitted to the
jury.
58. 484 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
60. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 5.06.1.
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scribed by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 4561 and 4762 that the opposing
party cannot frame a response, prepare a defense, or commence meaning-
ful discovery, the trial court can employ its authority under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 to order a repleader. 63 Rule 68 provides that "[t]he
court, when deemed necessary in any case, may order a repleader on the
part of one or both parties, in order to make their pleadings substantially
conform to the rules."' 64 By virtue of this rule, the trial court possesses the
authority to direct a repleader to make the pleadings conform substantially
to the rulings of the court and has the inherent power to enforce compli-
ance with such an order.65 Alternatively, Rules 68 and 9166 could be mod-
ified to give express authority to the trial court to order a repleader on the
motion of a party where the court determines that the pleadings are so
inadequate that meaningful discovery cannot be commenced.67
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE SPECIAL EXCEPTION TO A "NOTICE
PLEADING" SYSTEM
Use of a procedural device like the special exception is arguably inimi-
cal to a system designed for the use of notice pleadings coupled with lib-
eral opportunities for discovery. The fundamental rationale supporting
such a system provides that the technical fullness of the allegations in the
petition is unimportant so long as the pleading as a whole conveys fair
61. TEX. R. Civ. P. 45 provides:
Pleadings in the district and county courts shall
(a) Be by petition and answer.
(b) Consist of a statement in plain and concise language of the plaintiff's
cause of action or the defendant's grounds of defense. That an allegation be
evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall not be ground for objection when
fair notice to the opponent is given by the allegations as a whole.
(c) Contain any other matter which may be required by any law or rule
authorizing or regulating any particular action or defense.
(d) Be in writing, signed by the party or his attorney, and be filed with the
clerk. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
62. TEX. R. Civ. P. 47 provides:
An original pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
petition, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain
(a) a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of
the claim involved,
(b) in all claims for unliquidated damages only the statement that the
damages sought exceed the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court, and
(c) a demand for judgment for all the other relief to which the party deems
himself entitled.
Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded; pro-
vided, further, that upon special exception the court shall require the pleader
to amend so as to specify the maximum amount claimed.
63. See Shaw v. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co., 123 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1938, writ dism'd).
64. TEX. R. Civ. P. 68.
65. Shaw v. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co., 123 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1938, writ dism'd).
66. See supra note 10 (text of TEX. R. Civ. P. 91).
67. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (proposal for modifying rules 68 and
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notice of plaintiffs claim6 8-that is, that the petition alleges enough con-
cerning the time, place, and circumstances of the basic transaction or oc-
currence to permit identification of the area of dispute69-and that liberal
discovery practices exist to remove any uncertainties about the claims of
the parties. 70 Implicit in such a system are the notions that a party should
not be tested by how well he can articulate a claim but rather by whether
he can prove it at trial, and that there is a vital distinction between having
a claim and alleging it with technical accuracy.
7
'
Texas courts follow notice pleading standards in civil cases, having
made a "timid yet controversial" 72 step toward acceptance of this modern
philosophy in 1941 with the adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure 45 and
47. Rule 45 provides:
Pleadings in the district and county courts shall
(b) Consist of a statement in plain and concise language of the
plaintiffs cause of action or the defendant's grounds of defense. That
an allegation be evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall not be
ground for objection when fair notice to the opponent is given by the
allegations as a whole.
(c) Contain any other matter which may be required by any law
or rule authorizing or regulating any particular action or defense.
73
Rule 47 provides: "An original pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original petition, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party
claim, shall contain (a) a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to
give fair notice of the claim involved . . . . 74 Texas pleadings are suffi-
cient under these rules if they give fair and adequate notice to the adver-
sary.75 They need not be instruments of precision 76 and a party need not
plead his case with exactness. 77 Relaxation of the restrictive rules applica-
ble to the form of pleadings is calculated to minimize the number of cases
determined upon technicalities instead of upon their merits.
78
One can more easily answer the question whether the special exception
is applicable to, or even viable in, a system of notice pleading after exam-
ining how devices of similar function, such as the motions for bill of partic-
ulars and for more definite statement, fared when used in the federal
68. Newitt v. Camden Drilling Co., 552 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1977, no writ).
69. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 5.06.1.
70. Id. § 5.02.2.
71. 1d. § 6.12.
72. Id. § 5.02.2.
73. TEX. R. Civ. P. 45; see supra note 61 (full text of rule 45).
74. TEX. R. Civ. P. 47; see supra note 62 (full text of rule 47).
75. Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1977); Osteen v.
Crumpton, 519 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd).
76. Newitt v. Camden Drilling Co., 552 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1977, no writ).
77. Rodriguez v. Yenawine, 556 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ).
78. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 5.02.2.
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system between 1938 and 1946. 79 This empirical predicate provides both a
body of case law from which to ascertain the success in practice of these
particular pleading devices as well as a body of commentary that explains
the rationale for ultimately jettisoning them from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The federal rules do not countenance squabbles over the form of plead-
ings; rather, they embody the philosophy that "[l]awsuits should be deter-
mined on their merits and according to the dictates of justice, rather than
in terms of whether or not averments in the paper pleadings have been
artfully drawn." 80 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a
complaint set out "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief."81 What constitutes a short, plain statement
of a claim depends upon the circumstances of the case, 82 but the standards
generally applicable to notice pleadings require little specificity.8 3 The
federal rules are designed to assure fair notice of the facts and legal theo-
ries of the pleader 84 yet reflect the philosophy that litigation seldom can or
should be settled on the merits at the pleading stage" and that pleadings
do little more than indicate generally the type of litigation that is involved.
This policy rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome; it accepts the prin-
79. The federal rules of pleading are, of course, different from the Texas rules. In par-
ticular the federal rules require only that plaintiff plead a claim showing he is entitled to
relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publication, Inc., 370 F.2d
795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967). By contrast, the Texas rules prescribe that plaintiff shall plead a
cause of action. TEX. R. Civ. P. 45, 47. Some federal courts have interpreted claim as sub-
stantially synonymous with cause of action, and others have given it a much more relaxed
significance. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 6.11. Notwithstanding this distinction, the
yardstick for measuring compliance with each system's standards is whether they afford the
opposing party fair notice of the contentions made.
80. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1286 (1969).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) provides in full:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of juris-
diction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded.
Id. 8(a).
82. Atwood v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 243 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 829 (1958). This is also so in Texas pleading practice. 2 R. MCDONALD, supra note
7, § 5.02.2. McDonald states:
Where fair notice requires full and detailed allegations, these are required. In
complex controversies, lengthy pleadings may be essential to plead concisely a
legally enforceable claim.
But it also may be recognized that the case is relatively rare wherein the
plaintiff and the defendant do not know, even before the petition is filed, the
bounds of their main areas of difference.
Id.
83. McGuire v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902, 905 (5th Cir. 1964). The notable exception is that
a claim based upon fraud must be supported by specific allegations. Id.
84. K. SINCLAIR, FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 217 (1980).
85. Topping v. Fry, 147 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1945).
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ciple that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.86 The intent of rule 8(a), according to the United States Supreme
Court Advisory Committee, 87 is to permit the plaintiffs claim to be stated
in general terms. The committee report states that "the rules are designed
to discourage battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away the
needless controversies which the codes permitted that served either to de-
lay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial because of
mistakes in statement. 88
The federal rule 12(e) motions for bill of particulars and for more defi-
nite statement were adopted in 1937 together with the notice pleading
rules. Rule 12(e), as so promulgated, provided that such motions could be
filed with respect to any matter not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable a defendant to prepare his responsive pleadings or
to prepare for trial.89 The motions were used much as the special exception
is used today in Texas; they were leveled against an opponent whose com-
plaint was so vague or ambiguous or contained such broad generalizations
that the defendant could not frame an answer or understand the nature
and extent of the charges so as to prepare for trial.90 Their use was short-
lived, however. By 1946 rule 12(e) as originally drawn had been the sub-
ject of more judicial rulings than any other part of the federal rules and
had received much criticism from commentators, judges, and members of
the bar. 91
Many rule 12(e) motions focused on the provision in the rule that a
party could file a motion where the other party did not aver the complaint
86. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 8.03, at 8-2 1. Common law pleading, on the other
hand, was not primarily concerned about fair notice; it was concerned only with how the
parties had formulated issues and rested on the untenable ground that the parties knew
nothing of the matter in litigation except that which had been stated in the pleadings. Id.
8.03, at 8-22. Lawyers and laymen alike grew restless under practices that permitted cases to
be resolved on pleading points unrelated to the merits of the suit. Id. 8.01[4], at 8-8. This
dissatisfaction precipitated promulgation of FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which originated from
Federal Equity Rule 25. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 8.01[2], at 8-6.
87. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 8.01[3], at 8-8 (quoting ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF 1955).
88. Id.
89. Rule 12(e), as originally promulgated in the 1938 rules, provided:
Motion for More Definite Statement or for Bill of Particulars. Before re-
sponding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these
rules, within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him, a party may
move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. The motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion
is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice
of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such other order
as it deems just. A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading which it
supplements.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (1938) (amended 1946).
90. Brinley v. Lewis, 27 F. Supp. 313, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1939).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) advisory committee note accompanying 1946 amendments,
quoted in 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 12.01, at 2218.
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with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable the defendant to pre-
pare for trial.92 Some judges interpreted these words in the rule "more or
less in accordance with their plain meaning" 93 and held that a party could
use the motions for more definite statement and for bill of particulars to
require his adversary to define the issues he wished to raise and to provide,
with considerable particularity, the facts underlying the allegations 94 even
though the particulars sought could be obtained readily through
discovery.95
A majority of federal courts, however, implicitly disapproved of these
devices and took a hardened view toward their use.96 These courts virtu-
ally read the words "prepare for trial" out of the rule;9 7 most granted the
motions only where the pleadings to which they were addressed failed to
meet the minimal pleading requirements of rule 8, or did not give the mo-
vant sufficient notice of the claim made against him, or were not clear
enough to enable the movant to prepare a responsive pleading. 98
After only a few years of use, strong sentiment sprang up to alter rule
12(e). Under the federal rules, advocates of change argued, the pleadings
were intended to put a defendant on notice of the basic nature of the plain-
tiff's case; discovery and pretrial conferences would bear the primary bur-
den of information exchange and issue delineation.99 Rule 12(e) was thus
almost useless in light of the relation between rules 16 on pretrial confer-
ence and 8 on notice pleading, and rules 26 through 37 on discovery.1t°
The liberal granting of the motion for bill of particulars, moreover, was
92. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1375.
93. Id. § 1374; see e.g., Bowles v. Flotill Prods., Inc., 4 F.R.D. 499, 501-02 (N.D. Cal.
1945); Walling v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 2 F.R.D. 416, 419 (E.D.S.C. 1942) (not within
trial court's discretion to modify plain meaning of rule).
94. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1374; see, e.g., Kentucky-Tennessee
Light & Power Co. v. Fitch, 63 F. Supp. 989, 992 (W.D. Ky. 1946) (exact date of transaction
required); Raylite Elec. Corp. v. Noma Elec. Corp., 7 F.R.D. 239, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)(party entitled to information available from inspection of disputed device); Bowles v. Deep
Vein Connellsville Coke Co., 5 F.R.D. 140, 142 (W.D. Pa. 1946) (facts enabling party to
prepare case without undue expense required); United States v. United States Alkali Export
Ass'n, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 254, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (rule only requires facts to make responsive
pleading); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Kelly, 3 F.R.D. 28, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (names and
dates relevant to contract default must be provided); Fleming v. Enterprise Box Co., 36 F.
Supp. 606, 607 (S.D. Fla. 1940) (specific facts of transaction required if known by party);
Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union, Inc. v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 31 F. Supp. 483, 489(E.D. Ark. 1940) (facts required if they will facilitate trial preparation); Sweeney v. United
Feature Syndicate, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 419, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (party entitled to know what
parts of document are contested).
95. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1374; see, e.g., Bowles v. John F. Casey
Co., 5 F.R.D. 143, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1946); Fleming v. Southern Kraft Corp., 37 F. Supp. 232,
235 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
96. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1374; see, e.g., United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 76 F. Supp. 315, 316 (D. Mass. 1948); United States v. Association of
Am. R.Rs., 4 F.R.D. 510, 529 (D. Neb. 1945).
97. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1374; see, e.g., Canuso v. City of Niagara
Falls, 3 F.R.D. 374, 375 (W.D.N.Y. 1944); Mitchell v. Brown, 2 F.R.D. 325, 326 (D. Neb.
1942); Graziano v. Michigan Assoc. Express, Inc., I F.R.D. 530, 531 (N.D. I11. 1940).
98. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1374.
99. Id. § 1375.
100. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 12.17, at 2362.
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inconsistent with the scheme and spirit of the federal rules. As the court
noted in Braden v. Callaway:' 10 "It is quite obvious that the beneficial and
progressive method of pleading provided by Rule 8(a)(2) wherein a claim
for relief must be a short and plain statement would be entirely defeated
by a liberal construction of Rule 12(e)."' 0 2 The motions for more definite
statement and for bill of particulars, with their procedural focus upon the
pleadings as the source for deriving information about the plaintiffs claim,
played practical and theoretical havoc with the grand scheme of notice
pleading and liberal discovery. 10 3 They served to neutralize any helpful
benefits derived from rule 8 and overlooked the intended use of the rules
on depositions and discovery.l°4 Moreover, critics of the motions argued,
compliance with rule 8 was not intended to expose a party to rule 12(e)
attacks. '0 5
Accordingly, the motions for more definite statement and for bill of par-
ticulars, when actually used between 1938 and 1946 to test the sufficiency
of a federal plaintiffs complaint, were generally recognized as wholly in-
consonant with a system designed for notice pleading coupled with liberal
discovery opportunities. As one federal court observed:
The reason for the abolition of the bill of particulars and for the limi-
tation upon the motion for a more definite statement is that the rules
of discovery are available to elicit details. To maintain the rule for a
bill of particulars would have the effect to nullify Rule 8(a), Rules of
Civil Procedure, by expanding pleadings rather than condensing
them. '06
In addition to this rather glaring conceptual inconsistency, actual use of
rule 12(e) motions revealed further defects. The motions led to expense
and delay, 10 7 unduly taxed the time of the court in deciding the mo-
tions,l10 and occasionally placed a premium upon strategic maneuvering
of counsel rather than upon the merits of the issues involved.'0 9 Expense,
delay, harassment, and drain on judicial time and energy were constant
features of these practices.ll° One respected jurist disparagingly character-
ized them as a nuisance."I'
In place of the motions for more definite statement and bill of particu-
lars, the federal rules as amended now provide a narrower form of motion
for more definite statement that is currently used in the federal courts. 1 12
101. 4 F.R.D. 147 (E.D. Tenn. 1943).
102. Id. at 148.
103. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1375.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) advisory committee note accompanying 1946 amendment,
quoted in 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 12.01, at 2218.
105. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 12.17, at 2362.
106. Shafir v. Wabash R.R., 7 F.R.D. 467, 468 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
107. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. DuPont Textile Mills, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 236, 236-
37 (M.D. Pa. 1939).
108. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 21.17, at 2362.
109. Id.
110. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1375.
111. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 54 (2d ed. 1947).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) now reads:
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The availability of this motion, however, is quite restricted. 13 Numerous
decisions discussing the motion for more definite statement under
amended rule 12(e) repeat the warning that such motions are disfavored 114
and adhere to the policy that the motion should not be granted to require
evidentiary detail normally the subject of discovery." 15 Many courts have
denied rule 12(e) motions on the ground that the information requested
was properly the subject of discovery. 1 6 The amended rule, moreover, is
designed to strike at unintelligibility rather than want of detail. If the
pleadings meet the requirements of rule 8 and fairly notify the opposing
party of the nature of the claims, the court will deny a motion for more
definite statement. 17
The policy and utilitarian arguments that supported abolition of the mo-
tion for bill of particulars and the broad-form motion for more definite
statement equally support the contention that the special exception is
neither viable in nor appropriate for the integrated system of notice plead-
ing and liberalized discovery used in Texas. The pleading/discovery
scheme adopted in Texas in 1941 was designed so that pleadings are no
longer the single source for determining all the nuances of a plaintiffs
claim and with the view that probing, artful discovery should place flesh
upon skeletal allegations. One commentator stated:
[T]he uncertainties of the parties frequently can be removed more effi-
ciently by liberal discovery practice and by effective pretrial confer-
ences than by an exchange of formal legal correspondence decked out
in the trappings of written pleadings. . . . The availability of discov-
ery procedures relieves the pleader of the burden of alleging the de-
tails of the claim or defense as meticulously as may be sought in
preparation for trial."18
The special exception, which serves the same functions as did the motions
for bill of particulars and for more definite statement, seeks evidentiary
Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted
and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the
order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems
just.
113. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1376.
114. See, e.g., Thrasher v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 534 F. Supp. 103, 106 (E.D.
Mo. 1981); Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 523 F. Supp. 631, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Choat v.
Rome Indus., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 387, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Bazal v. Belford Trucking Co.,
442 F. Supp. 1089, 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Gawn v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 254 F. Supp. 1005,
1006 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
115. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 12.18, at 2395-96; see, e.g., Famolare, Inc. v. Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Donovan v. American Leader
Newspapers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp.
714, 719 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
116. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 80, § 1376.
117. 2A J. MOORE, s.upra note 37, 12.19[l], at 2389.
118. 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, §§ 5.02.2, 5.05.
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detail from pleadings rather than from discovery; it focuses attention upon
allegations rather than upon proof. In practice, moreover, the special ex-
ception suffers from the same pragmatic deficiencies as did the motions for
more definite statement and for bill of particulars. As discussed above, the
special exception practice leads to expense and delay and acts as a drain
upon judicial time and energy.
As with the federal rules, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure place the
primary burden of information exchange and issue delineation on the dis-
covery process. Rule 47 requires a short statement sufficient to give fair
notice of the claim involved; 19 rule 186a, on the other hand, permits dis-
covery of any matter not privileged that is relevant to the subject matter
involved or is reasonably calculated to relate to the discovery of evidence
admissible at trial.' 20 The former rule is designed to elicit cursory allega-
tions; the latter is geared to adduce the evidentiary foundation for plain-
tiff's case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, writing in the context of pleading
challenges raised under amended rule 12(e), a more limited pleading chal-
lenge than the special exception but nevertheless an instigator of pleading
skirmishes, expressed sentiments that Texas trial judges weary of supervis-
ing repeated pleading battles could easily echo:
A great deal of time has been spent in this case in a struggle to get
the plaintiff's pleadings in better shape. As this court has often re-
marked, time spent this way is usually wasted. A better procedure
than the so-called "trial" of "preliminary issues" would have been to
proceed at once to a consideration of the merits either by means of a
motion for summary judgment or of a full trial of the factual issues
presented by the pleadings.' 21
The special exception, as a device to require more detailed pleadings, ap-
pears just as inapplicable to Texas practice, both as a practical matter and
as a matter of policy, as were the motions for more definite statement and
bill of particulars under the former federal practice.
IV. PROPOSED RULE CHANGES
Before proposing curative rule changes, one must address the contention
that no rule changes are necessary. The argument against rule changes
reasons that in the face of superior procedural alternatives and in an envi-
ronment of liberalized pleading standards the special exception will simply
fall into disuse as lawyers increasingly turn to such alternatives and trial
judges more frequently overrule special exceptions in deference to the lib-
eralized pleading standards. Although the special exception could con-
ceivably wither away, that result is not likely. Even setting aside the verity
that habits are not easily broken, the special exception is an indispensable
part of current Texas procedure because pleadings in Texas are construed
119. TEX. R. Civ. P. 47.
120. Id. 186a.
121. Michael v. Clark Equip. Co., 380 F.2d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 1967).
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liberally in the absence of a special exception. ' 22 It is somewhat incongru-
ous in a system that ostensibly embraces the maxims of liberalized plead-
ing for failure to allege a pleading defect to entitle a petition to an even
more liberal construction than already provided by the rules. Neverthe-
less, the continued vitality of this doctrine necessarily prolongs the life of
the special exception because the careful practitioner must give it due
regard.
The special exception, moreover, can function usefully as a tool to delay
prosecution of a claim and will likely be used for dilatory purposes. Com-
mentators have observed, in the analogous context of federal rule 12(e),
that even when the motion for a bill of particulars was filed and denied, its
pendency postponed the defendant's obligation to answer and conse-
quently delayed progression of the case past the pleadings. 123 The zealous
Texas advocate will certainly not voluntarily relinquish use of a potentially
effective tactical device like the special exception.
Accordingly, the best method for eliminating the negative attributes of
special exception practice is to change the applicable Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 68 should be amended as follows: 124
The court, when deemed necessary in any case, or on the motion of
any party, may order a repleader on the part of one or both of the
parties, in order to make their pleadings substantially conform to the
rules or to give a party fair notice of the claims or defenses of the
opposing party such that discovery can be commenced by the moving
party.
Rule 90 should be amended to read as follows:
General demurrers shall not be used. fEvery .f,e - fatat
n a l ading either of form ex of substancc, which is not spcifi ca y
Fointa d out by ionrtioul i9n writing and brought to the attention of the
judge in the trial couirt before the instrue.tion or eharge to the. jtt.., or,
in~ a try , bce the judgment is signed, shall be Jccmc
waived by M atyscig reversal on such account, provided ha
thig rule shall not FPply as9 tO an"y partY agafitst whom a default Judg
rncnt is ren 'ie.d.1
In addition, rule 91 should be repealed in its entirety, and all references to
special exceptions contained in other procedural rules should be likewise
eliminated. 25 This proposal will abrogate use of the special exception and
122. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 90;see also L & B Oil Co. v. Arnold, 620 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 198 1, writ dism'd); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Cattleman's Prod. Credit Ass'n,
617 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ); Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591
S.W.2d 907, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
123. Zimmerman v. Fillah, 5 F.R.D. 80, 81 (D.D.C. 1946); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 80, § 1375.
124. The text of the proposed rule is set forth here in the form recommended for submis-
sion of proposed rule changes. See Pope & McConnico, supra note 9, at 21-22, 22 n.87.
125. In order to achieve conformity with this proposal, TEX. R. Civ. P. 47 should be
amended so that a trial court could require a plaintiff to amend his petition to state the
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substitute instead a motion that recognizes and focuses upon the salutary
role that discovery plays in the Texas system of notice pleading.
If, however, complete elimination of the role of the special exception is
deemed too drastic, Texas could retain the special exception while altering
its functions. Rules 68 and 90 could be maintained in their present form
and rule 91 amended to read as follows:
A special exception shall not only point out the particular pleading
excepted to, but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particular-
ity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insuf-
ficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted to. A special
exception shall not be made when the information sought or the de-
fect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency
alleged can reasonably be obtained or cured by discovery.
The rule changes propounded are closely analogous in purpose and
function to the modified form of the federal rule 12(e) motion for more
definite statement now used in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. Although under the express terms of rule 12(e)
a party may use such a motion when the movant cannot reasonably be
required to frame an answer or other responsive pleading, 126 local rule
5.2(d) 127 of the Northern District of Texas has modified the rule so that a
party generally 28 may not file the motion "when the information sought
can be obtained by discovery."' 129 This rule recognizes the interrelation-
ship between pleading and discovery that exists in the federal system.
Texas should likewise adopt rules of procedure that are consonant with its
integrated notice pleading/liberalized discovery system.
V. CONCLUSION
The process of change is always difficult and time-consuming. 30 Yet as
Chief Justice Pope has observed: "Study and revision of the rules of civil
procedure will never be completed. Procedural rules will need to be con-
tinually reexamined to determine whether they expedite or retard the ad-
ministration of justice."'13 1 The process of questioning the efficacy of well-
entrenched practices when the burden they place upon the judicial system
maximum amount of unliquidated damages claimed on motion of the defendant rather than
upon special exception. To raise other defects in a plaintiffs petition, such as failure to
plead special damages as required by TEX. R. Civ. P. 56, a defendant would be entitled to
move for repleader under rule 68 as amended.
126. 2A J. MOORE, supra note 37, 12.01120], at 2218.
127. N.D. TEX. R. 5.2(d), reprinted in TEXAS RULES OF COURT 489 (Desk Copy 1982).
128. The sole exception is for matters required to be pled specifically by FED. R. Civ. P.
9(b).
129. This rule codifies the notion expressed by one federal judge: "Now the pleadings are
restricted to the task of general notice giving and details such as those sought by the motion
for more definite statement are to be obtained by the deposition-discovery processes, Rule
26 et seq., F.R.C.P., so amply available." Redfern v. Collins, 113 F. Supp. 892, 897 (E.D.
Tex 1953) (Sheehy, J.).
130. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
131. Pope & McConnico, supra note 9, at 22.
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exceeds the benefit to be derived is not a novel one. Texas courts, for
example, have relied upon such reasoning to level effective criticism at the
practice of appealing interlocutory rulings on temporary injunction appli-
cations,' 32 although such appeals are expressly allowed by statute. 133
Neither should courts avoid reexamination of rudimentary practices when
they no longer promote the just and fair resolution of lawsuits. The adher-
ence in Texas to liberalized notice pleading standards raises serious ques-
tions about the necessity for devices that test the form of pleadings.
"The ultimate criterion for adoption of a rule change is whether the
change will promote a better administration of justice."' 34  Rightfully,
those on whom our supreme court relies to investigate, debate, and pro-
pose procedural reforms actively solicit suggested improvements in Texas
procedure. 35 In this spirit, the author suggests that the Texas Supreme
Court and its advisors reexamine the viability of the special exception
practice in light of the policy and practical questions raised in this Article
and consider promulgating salutary alternatives.
132. See Reeder v. Intercontinental Plastics Mfg. Co., 581 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Town Plaza Fabrics, Inc. v. Monumental Properties of Texas,
Inc., 544 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Irving Bank & Trust Co.
v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
In Charter Medical Corp. v. Miller, 547 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ),
Justice Robertson observed:
[T]his appeal, like many other temporary injunction appeals, appears to be
entirely unnecessary . . . . We see no reason why the case could not have
been prosecuted to final judgment in less time than that required by this in-
terim interlocutory appeal, which decides nothing except whether the status
quo should be preserved pending trial on the merits.
Id. at 79. Indeed, Chief Justice Pope has characterized two particular rules of civil proce-
dure promulgated in 1941, TEX. R. Civ. P. 383 and 474, as being "uninstructive" and afford-
ing "little guidance to the bench and bar." Pope & McConnico, Practicing Law with the 1981
Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 521 (1980).
133. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4662 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
134. O'Connor, How You Can Change a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure, 41 TEX. B.J.
1073, 1075 (1978).
135. Id.
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